“If you’re explaining, you’re losing” – Ronald Reagan
By the time FIFA, or more specifically, Gianni Infantino, explained why they wanted private investment in the World Cup, the argument had already been lost. The lesson is broader than football: strategic communications cannot begin once the deal is already on the table.
Under the plan, FIFA would have transferred the commercial rights and operations linked to the World Cup and its other competitions into a new entity.
The proposal raised legitimate questions about whether private investors should have a stake in competitions that many regard as belonging to the game itself.
FIFA’s communications failure was not solely that it struggled to sell the idea. The issue was that the proposal reached the public domain before those questions had been stress-tested.
Private investment in sport is not a new concept. The advent of the Premier League in 1992, and the influx of foreign ownership of England’s historic football clubs that followed, has divided fans for years. Questions about the integrity of the game, and who the sport should ultimately belong to, are the essence of modern football.
Elsewhere, in 2021, private equity group CVC Capital Partners agreed to pay up to £365 million for a stake in the Six Nations. The deal was presented in the wake of the pandemic as a means of stabilising and growing Rugby Union, much the same toolkit favoured by Infantino.
FIFA, however, had no comparable case. It had just delivered a record-breaking World Cup in terms of revenue raised, and holds billions of dollars in cash reserves. The need for outside investment was far harder to establish.
FIFA argued that the proceeds could support facilities, coaching and the growth of football in smaller nations. But that rationale came too late and answered the wrong question. The objection that defined the debate was not how money might be spent, but whether FIFA had the right to offer private investors a stake at all.
UEFA’s textbook intervention
Ultimately, Infantino saw a commercial opportunity. UEFA – football’s most influential continental federation – saw a question of ownership and governance.
That distinction shaped the entire debate. With the backing of its 55 member associations, UEFA “unanimously and unequivocally” rejected the proposal and said its national teams would not participate in FIFA competitions while the plan remained alive.
Its response did not focus on whether FIFA had secured an attractive valuation or whether the proceeds might fund development. It challenged the premise of the transaction itself. By declaring that European football and the World Cup were “not for sale”, UEFA framed the issue as one of ownership, stewardship and legitimacy, arguing that FIFA had no moral authority to sell an asset it said belonged to the wider game.
UEFA also condemned the secrecy surrounding the proposal and described the process as “governance by intimidation”. But it worked because UEFA understood the question its audiences were asking: who has the right to sell, and to whom does the game belong?
FIFA did not.
The proposal was revealed by The Times before FIFA had established its own account of what it was trying to achieve. The initial discussion therefore centred on the sale of the World Cup, private investors and a multibillion-dollar valuation.
Strategic comms must be used earlier
Now, a better launch would not necessarily have rescued the plan. That is precisely the point.
Strategic communications should not begin once a decision has been made. It should test how stakeholders are likely to understand a proposal, whether its rationale addresses their concerns and whether the risks call for it to be changed or abandoned.
Viewed through that lens, the weakness in FIFA’s proposal should have been apparent long before it reached the public domain.
Its proposal may have looked attractive commercially, but through the eyes of supporters, governing bodies and national associations it appeared to turn the World Cup into an investment product.
No amount of polishing could remove that basic objection.
FIFA may have identified an attractive commercial moment, with revenues and valuations at record levels. But it completely misjudged the reputational one. The best time to sell on a spreadsheet can be the worst time to ask stakeholders to accept it.
